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Transnational Capital and the Politics of Global Supply Chains
Abstract
In the latest phase of globalization, transnational corporations based in the U.S. have worked closely with
U.S. foreign policymakers to secure favorable foreign direct investment provisions within U.S. domestic
legislation and within U.S. trade agreements. These interactions between transnational firms and the U.S.
state have provided many of the preconditions for an expansion of foreign direct investment connected to
capital liberalization and the growth of global supply chains from the 1980s to the present. This
relationship is best conceptualized as representing a “transnational interest bloc,” whose policy objectives
are incorporated within investment provisions in US-backed trade and investment agreements.
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Introduction
The US state has used its power, in concert with sectors of transnational capital, to
promote the conditions for the growth of a global production system characterized by global
supply chains and financed by a global network of institutional investors. The firms located at
the top of the global supply chain, often referred to as “system integrator firms”, have achieved
disproportionate power in the US political system that has affected state policy in a number of
areas, including tax law, trade agreements, and foreign economic policy. Here I examine the
conceptual and historical contours of the relationship between transnational firms, the US state
and the growth of global supply chains.
Beginning in the 1970s, corporations based in the US expanded their lobbying networks
and policy planning organizations to shift policy in a more conservative direction. A wide body
of scholarly literature has documented this shift, which resulted in lower taxation, deregulation,
weakened labor laws and weakened antitrust laws. Corporations looked to reduce costs in the
context of increased global competition. Fortune 500 firms were experiencing declining profit
rates from the mid-1960s through the early 1980s, and sought to reverse these trends by a
combination of economic and political strategies. A convergence of events during the 1980s
allowed some US-based transnational corporations to begin the process of corporate
restructuring. This involved a shift from a multidivisional corporate form to a multisubsidiary
corporate form. As part of this process, corporations looked to reduce costs by concentrating on
the most value-added aspects of the production process, including ownership of patents,
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branding, marketing and distribution of products. Transnational production strategies shifted
from ownership and control of production to subcontracting with independent producers or
creating a subsidiary structure of production that reduces the costs and risks of parent firms.
Across the Fortune 500, increasingly referred to as the Global 500, corporations at the top of the
value chain were increasingly selling their corporate divisions that produced products in
exchange for arms-length relationships with independent supply networks.
System integrator firms refer to those transnational corporations that are located at the top
of global value and supply chains. Their control of patents, branding, marketing and distribution
networks give these firms a disproportionate ability to exercise market power relative to firms
located below them in global supply networks. The pace of corporate consolidation at the top of
global supply chains has been accelerated from the 1980s to the present, with mergers and
acquisitions going through a 4th phase during the 1980s, and another 5th phase that extended from
the 1990s through the 2000s. The two most recent waves of mergers and acquisitions differ from
earlier corporate strategies in that the most powerful transnational firms have used their market
power to gain control of activities that are the most profitable within a global system of
production. Transnational firms based in the US have succeeded in using their political power,
lobbying networks, and policy planning organizations to weaken US antitrust laws and to
establish favorable changes in the US tax code that have contributed to global corporate
restructuring. The next section examines the roots of the policymaking initiatives advanced by
transnational corporate interests in the late 1970s and early 1980s that facilitated corporate
reorganization (Cox, 2012).
The Long Downturn and Crisis of Fordist Production
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U.S. corporations faced a systemic crisis of profitability that can be measured by falling
rates of profit of Fortune 500 firms from the mid-1960s to the mid-1980s. By the mid-1960s,
corporate profits as a percentage of overall corporate revenue began falling. Another set of
measurements, revealing the same trend, indicates that corporate profits were falling in relation
to gross domestic income of the U.S. (Milberg, Winkler 2008: 8). These trends had significant
effects on both the economic and political activities of corporations in the U.S.
For U.S. corporations, the traditional approach to maintaining profit rates had been to use
oligopolistic market power and position to raise prices. This strategy could only be used by firms
whose market share in a given industry was at a level of concentration that made it cost
prohibitive for new firms to effectively enter the market and to compete at lower prices. The
most globally competitive US-based corporations in automobiles, steel, chemicals, and machine
tools enjoyed such an advantage over their competitors through the immediate post-World War
II period. This enabled these firms to effectively capture the most dynamic high-value added
segments of the US market against domestic and foreign competitors for the first two decades
after WWII. However, by the mid-1960s, there were visible cracks in the oligopolistic structures
that allowed these firms to dominate the US market.
Rising competition from Japanese and German exporters, followed by market penetration
from the newly industrializing countries of Asia, weakened the hold that US-based oligopolies
had on the US domestic market. The ability of US oligopolistic firms in key industries to raise
prices to maintain profitability was undercut by the influx of greater foreign competition.
Furthermore, foreign firms that retooled after WWII had a built-in advantage over their US
counterparts: they adopted newer technologies that made them more competitive and had a lower
time horizon of “sunken” costs compared to their US competitors. US firms, having developed
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their productive assets during the 1930s, had higher pension and medical care obligations than
their foreign counterparts—a reflection of both the high levels of privatization of these costs in
the US compared to Europe and the lengthier time horizon for US firms in being obligated to
these costs. During the first two decades of the post-World War II period, the most globally
competitive US firms could use their status as “early industrializers” to establish oligopolies that
dominated the US market in all of the leading sectors of manufacturing. That strategy was
becoming untenable with the rise of increased global competition.
U.S. corporations had to look to other strategies in an attempt to overcome the declining
rate of profit. A convergence of events in the late 1970s and early 1980s led corporations to
restructure their operations through M @ A strategies that involved buying out, or merging with,
competitor firms and subsequently shedding assets in a restructuring process designed to focus
business operations around a core set of activities. This involved a reorganization of the
corporation around global supply chains in which the highest value added profits accrued to
corporations at the top of the chain. From the mid-1980s to the present, there has been a greater
concentration of market share controlled by corporations at the top of the value-added chain of
production, especially in “the high-technology and/or strongly branded segments of the global
markets” (Nolan, Zhang, Liu 2007: 23). This process has coexisted with an increasingly
complex global production system of small and medium-sized producers and suppliers that
competes with each other to satisfy the terms of production that are increasingly being
established by the “system integrators” at the top of the supply chain. The restructuring process
that began in the 1980s has accelerated to the present, increasingly financed by institutional
investors through the purchase of corporate shares. This financialization of production has
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accelerated the pace and scope of global value chains made possible by tremendous
technological advances and by the liberalization of financial markets throughout the world.
The US state has played an important role in the establishment of global supply chains
through a number of mechanisms that will be the focus of the next section of this chapter. First,
the Reagan Administration during the 1980s was very ideologically supportive and
accommodating to the lobbying efforts of transnational business organizations in weakening
antitrust law. This helped provide the preconditions for the dramatic expansion of corporate
mergers and acquisitions that led to a reorganization of production. Corporations established
lobbying networks coordinated by groups such as the Business Roundtable to lobby for the
weakening of antitrust law. The corporate leaders of the Business Roundtable viewed M @ A
strategies as one important tool to reverse the declining rate of corporate profits. By taking
advantage of state policies that facilitated M @ A, corporations could potentially restructure their
operations in a manner to make them more attractive to the financial sector. Institutional
investors provided financing for firms that were willing to shed costly assets, including domestic
infrastructure and jobs, in favor of concentrating on core activities that would then be
complemented by a greater reliance on global supply chains to lower the costs of needed inputs.
Business Mobilization and US Policy
The structural economic crises facing the top 500 industrial corporations intensified
during the 1970s and early 1980s. Increased global competition sliced into the market share of
once privileged firms, whose debt levels steadily increased during this period, especially from
1980 to 1984 when debt soured from 68.3% of equity to 81.4% (Prechel 1997: 414). The
problems were exacerbated by the previous strategies of US-based firms during the 1960s to
solve the long-term accumulation crises by acquiring unrelated businesses in an attempt to
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counter the beginning stages of declining rates of profit. The so-called third merger and
acquisitions wave of the 1960s created large-scale conglomerates that were extremely top heavy,
which over the long term added to the cost burdens of firms faced with greater global
competition for markets in the 1970s and 1980s. By 1969, the share prices of US conglomerates
dropped almost 50 percent from their previous high, including firms such as Litton, Gulf and
Western, and Textron. In response to these trends, merger activity slowed dramatically during
the 1970s, as corporations sought to concentrate on stabilizing a management structure that had
to juggle complex product divisions which were all competing for resources. The efforts toward
more effective management strategies failed, as reflected in a dramatic fall in the rate of profit
during this period for the top 500 industrial firms from 7.7% from 1973 to 1981 to 4.8% from
1982-1986 (Prechel, 1997: 414).
In this context, US-based corporations increased their levels of political mobilization in
an effort to shift US state policy in a more conservative direction. As numerous authors have
documented, corporate political mobilization was achieved through an expansion of corporate
think tanks and foundations, greater cooperation among business lobbying groups that had
previously been more competitive, a dramatic infusion of lobbying dollars that proved pivotal in
affecting legislation, and agenda-setting strategies that were reinforced by the rise of neoliberal
ideology (Ferguson and Rogers 1984; Cox and Skidmore-Hess 1999; Jenkins and Eckert 2000).
While the myth of the median voter persists in political science literature, the real politics of the
right turn could be found in the intersection between the corporate boardroom and the political
establishment. Business policy organizations such as the moderately conservative Business
Roundtable and the American Enterprise Institute, and the ultraconservatives associated with the
US Chambers of Commerce, the National Association of Manufacturers, the Hoover Institution
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and the Heritage Foundation were influential in establishing the parameters of legislative options
during the late 1970s and early 1980s (Akard 1992; Davis and Greve 1997; Jenkins and Eckert
2000).
The Business Roundtable, established in 1972, represented the most internationally
competitive sectors of US business, and served as a kind of all-purpose political consulting
organization to develop long-term strategic thinking for corporations faced with declining rates
of profit (Burris, 1992; Dreiling 2000; Carroll, Carson 2003). Resting uneasily amidst a looseknit membership of top financial and manufacturing firms alongside emerging top retail
corporations, the Roundtable could not always move forward with positions that would be
acceptable to the entirety of its membership base. Nevertheless, the organization sought to
develop a political strategy that would begin to counter the falling rate of profit that was faced by
a wide cross-section of its corporate membership. This included weakening US labor laws,
relaxing federal regulations, weakening antitrust provisions, and enabling corporate restructuring
through favourable shifts in US tax laws.
One of the first shots across the bow of effective business mobilization occurred in 1978,
when the Business Roundtable, the US Chambers of Commerce and the National Association of
Manufacturers put their muscle behind the Revenue Act of 1978, which reduced the capital
gains tax to 28% and locked in a 10% investment tax credit (Jenkins and Eckert 2000: 316-317).
With the election of Ronald Reagan, conservative economic policies continued and expanded,
including the Economic Recovery Tax Act, which in 1981 provided an increased depreciation
allowance for fixed capital investments alongside a reduction in the progressivity of personal
income taxes, amounting to the largest tax cut in history (Jenkins and Eckert 2000: 317). Initially
supported by both the Business Roundtable and the Chambers of Commerce and NAM, within
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two years the affects of this legislation divided the corporate lobbies. Wall Street interests were
concerned about the inflationary impact of lower taxes, and the leading corporate foundations
differed over the priorities that should drive legislation, with the conservative American
Enterprise Institute favoring balanced budgets over supply side tax cuts, while the Heritage
Foundation and the Hoover Institute favored a supply side strategy of tax cutting as the longterm solution to all other problems.
In this context of corporate political divisions, the Business Roundtable played a crucial
role in advancing the interests of the most internationally competitive US corporations. First the
Roundtable supported increased taxes as a strategy to help check inflation (and thereby a partial
reversal of the ERTA), followed by lobbying efforts by the organization on behalf of
Congressional legislation that would facilitate a more thoroughgoing corporate restructuring. The
passage of the Tax Reform Act of 1986 was a Congressional response to the ongoing crises of
business profitability, reflected in rising debt to equity ratios and an inability of firms to use
lower capital gains taxes and greater depreciation allowances to reverse declining rates of profit.
The 1986 Act “provided tax free mechanisms to transfer capital among parts of the corporate
family” (Prechel, 1997: 17). Concretely, this provision allowed corporations to more easily shift
their corporate structure from multidivisional forms (MDF) to multilayered subsidiary forms
(MLSF). Corporations could replace divisions that were previously owned by the firm and
managed by the central office with subsidiaries that would be legally independent of the
corporation while still being financially controlled by the corporate parent. This allowed
corporations much greater flexibility in financing their operations due to the fact that divisions
which were previously wholly owned by the firm were shifted to the status of subsidiary
corporations that could raise money on their own through stock sales.
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Thus the financialization of corporate profits was facilitated by changes in US tax law in
1986, with the Business Roundtable leading the way in lobbying for the legislation. The shift in
corporate structure from the MDF to the MLSF allowed corporations, at tax free rates, to
restructure their operations by shedding legal responsibility for corporate divisions that were
previously managed by the central office. This multilayered structure allowed for a greater
reliance on stocks, as opposed to external financing from banks, to generate revenue for
subsidiaries and greater options for the parent firm, who could then use stock revenue from their
subsidiaries to retire corporate debt. The shift in corporate structure facilitated the global
restructuring of the corporation, with the central office of the parent company establishing a farflung network of subsidiary firms that would produce a range of products at arms-length from
the legal obligations of the parent corporation. With control over subsidiaries requiring only 50%
plus one of financing, corporations could easily shift ties from subsidiaries to independent
suppliers and contractors in an effort to further restructure the corporate form. This downsizing
of corporate assets allowed firms to establish greater control over the high-valued added parts of
the production process, increasingly centered around branding, marketing and distribution, while
shifting the higher costs and riskier activities further down the supply chain.
Such a restructuring strategy would not have been possible without the fourth wave of
mergers in US history during the 1980s. This merger wave, unlike the conglomerate trend of the
1960s, was characterized by firms purchasing firms in the same industry and downsizing other
activities that were deemed peripheral to future profit streams. The Tax Reform Act of 1986
included a provision that allowed corporations to use their acquisitions of other firms to qualify
for tax free status, as long as the acquisition “was in the same or a related product line as the
existing business” (Prechel, 2000: 257). This law followed an extended period of reduced
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enforcement of antitrust policy during the Reagan Administration. Reagan’s Treasury Secretary,
Attorney General, and Commerce Secretary supported an antitrust policy that would relax
provisions of the Clayton Act which specified that mergers and acquisitions should be prohibited
when “the effect of such acquisition may be to substantially lessen competition or tend to create
monopoly” (Prechel, 2000: 257). Within this context, the Reagan Administration’s first antitrust
chief in the Justice Department, William Baxter, “rewrote the antitrust guidelines to raise the
level of market concentration that triggered a Justice Department challenge to conglomerate
mergers, vertical combinations between suppliers and customers, and horizontal mergers
between competitors” (Prechel 2000: 257).
The mergers and acquisitions wave of the 1980s began a process of restructuring by USbased transnational firms that intensified during the 1990s and 2000s. With each passing decade,
corporations have used favourable changes in US antitrust and tax laws to facilitate the
establishment of global production networks which have been essential in efforts to attempt to
stabilize profit rates after two decades of steady decline. Since 1986, US-based corporations have
relied on imports from global supply chains for a steadily higher percentage of inputs in
production. In the manufacturing sector alone, “offshoring intensity of material inputs reached
14.5% in 2006, up from 11.6% in 1998, 6.2% in 1984 and 4.1% in 1974” (Milberg, 2010: 6).
However, not all firms are created equal in their linkage to global value chains. Corporations
involved in the production of electrical equipment, telecommunications, computer and electronic
products, motor vehicles, transportation equipment and apparel were disproportionately involved
in offshoring of material inputs. Firms in these sectors, by 2006, were relying on the offshoring
of material inputs for as much as 20 to 25% of non-energy inputs used in their final product
(Milberg and Winkler 2009: 281).
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Aggregate numbers reveal a similar picture of a US economy that is much more firmly
tied to offshoring and global supply chains than has been the case historically. By 2004, “52% of
US imports were intra-firm” and “intermediaries accounted for 38% of US imports” (Milberg,
2010: 6). A simulation model of US trade found that “vertical specialization—the sequential
vertical trading chain stretching across many countries, with each country specializing in
particular stages of a good’s production sequence—accounted for over 50% of the growth of US
trade in the period 1962-1997” (Yi, 2003). One indication of the growth of “vertical
specialization” is the increasing reliance, from 1986 to the present, by US transnational firms on
imports of products from developing countries, whose imports to the US as a percentage of
overall imports have steadily risen from 1986 to the present. In 1986, US imports from
developing countries constituted about 36% of total US imports, while by 2006 this figure had
reached 56%, reflecting a steady increase that reached 40% in 1990, and 45% in 1996 (Milberg
2010: 425).
US-based transnational firms have used a process of restructuring to expand reliance on
subsidiaries, subcontractors, and foreign production networks to reduce costs and enhance profit
margins. The US state shaped the initial stages of this strategy through favourable tax laws and
easing of antitrust enforcement. Transnational corporations were able to shed costly corporate
divisions at home in favour of a greater reliance on subsidiaries. The mergers and acquisitions
wave of the 1980s was financed by leveraged buyouts, which facilitated a restructuring process
that has been accelerating during the past two decades. During the 1990s, firms used stocks to
finance further mergers and acquisitions, a process which further concentrated corporate
ownership at the top of the global value chain. For example, measurements of corporate
consolidation by industry reveal a steady increase in concentration of ownership in
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telecommunications, information technology, electrical equipment, agribusiness, automobiles,
retail and clothing, airlines, hotels, fast food and computer and electronics production.
But the oligopoly structure does not mean corporate control of production from top to
bottom. Instead, there is greater corporate consolidation at the top of the value chain, as
corporations consolidate control in the US market over the most lucrative and value added
aspects of production, especially design, branding, marketing and distribution of a finished
product. The control of the top of the production structure gives corporations the ability to exert
greater leverage over a widely dispersed supply network, which has increasingly shifted to parts
of the developing world. The ability of US-based transnational firms to restructure their
operations has been at least partially dependent on the actions of the US state in opening foreign
markets to greater foreign trade and investment. Just as the US state has provided transnational
firms with favourable changes in domestic tax and antitrust legislation, the US state has also
been very important in negotiating reductions in trade and investment barriers with developing
countries to facilitate the emergence of a global supply network. US corporate investment in
foreign supply networks has been facilitated by greater access to foreign stock and bond markets,
which has given US transnational firms the ability to link directly with foreign producers through
the creation of subsidiaries or through minority shares in production networks dispersed across a
range of locations and countries. A greater percentage of US corporate profits from the early
1990s to 2006 have been directed to financial investments in stock and bond markets, including a
rising percentage of these investments in the emerging markets of the developing world
(Krippner 2005: 284-186). At the same time, corporations are paying out more revenues as
dividend payments to shareholders, while reducing wages paid to US workers and while
investing less in productive plant and equipment in the US (Serfati 2008:40-42). As I will

12

document in the remaining sections of this article, US state policy has provided an important
nexus between US firms and the global supply networks that have been established in the
developing markets of the global economy.
Transnational Corporate Political Networks and Global Supply Chains
During the 1980s to the present, US state policy has worked toward the liberalization of
capital investment opportunities for US financial and non-financial firms in the developing
world. The extent to which the US state has succeeded in advancing capital liberalization has
largely depended on a wide range of factors, including the degree of political and economic ties
between transnational political and economic elites in the US and the developing country,
macroeconomic circumstances such as debt crises, and institutional factors particular to
individual states that either facilitate or hinder the advancement and implementation of neoliberal
projects favoured by the US. Here I will examine the emergence of transnational corporate
political networks as vehicles for the restructuring of capital markets in developing countries.
The pivot point for the establishment of these networks were domestic changes within the US
corporation that have been discussed in the previous section, especially the shift from a corporate
structure based on a multidivisional form to a multilayered subsidiary structure. This shift
provided the basis for a political alliance between institutional financial investors that were
becoming much more important within corporate boardrooms and non-financial firms that were
committed to expanding production networks into the markets of developing countries. The
hegemonic restructuring of developing markets, led by the US state and supported by US-based
corporate interests, received additional political and economic support from an emerging
transnational class within the developing world that was increasingly linked to global finance. In
circumstances where these alliances were particularly strong, the greater the chances for the
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advancement and implementation of neoliberal policies favouring the establishment of global
supply networks, by way of relaxation of laws governing foreign direct investment and through
expanded access to portfolio markets.
The dramatic expansion of foreign access to capital markets in the developing world
represented a significant structural feature of the shift to new methods of capital accumulation.
William Robinson has captured the shift as one from Fordist production relationships based on
national markets to globalized production networks dispersed across state borders (Robinson
2004). This conception of the new globalization accentuates the characteristics associated with
the most mobile sectors of capital, whose reorganization of the corporate form, described in the
previous section, allowed for the most highly profitable production activities, centered around
research and development, marketing, distribution and branding, to be disassembled from the
other stages of production, increasingly dispersed across states and global markets and no longer
owned or controlled directly by the parent firm. This delinking of different stages of the
production process is not entirely novel, but the degree to which the dispersal of component parts
of the production process is scattered across a multiplicity of states has created both economic
and political linkages that are unprecedented in scope and scale.
The leading transnational firms that epitomize Robinson’s conception of a “Transnational
Capitalist Class,” are most significantly correlated with particular sectors, and specifically the
most competitive global corporations within those sectors, of global production, especially
computers and electronics, telecommunications, pharmaceuticals, electrical equipment, motor
vehicles, media and entertainment, agribusiness and apparel. The growth and concentration of
assets within global investment and commercial banking, as well as the emergence of a new
category of institutional financial investors managing large-scale assets such as pensions and
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mutual funds, etc., have developed in tandem with this emerging global production system. At
the same time, the emergence of powerful retail corporations has helped to consolidate this new
global production system, illustrated by Wal-Mart’s ability to use its tremendous market power
to affect prices, wages and costs of production throughout key locations in the global supply
chain. The reorganization of corporate structures in the US during the 1980s created deepening
ties between institutional financial investors and non-financial corporations, who relied much
more on stocks and the ownership of financial assets to consolidate their position in global
markets during the merger and acquisition waves of the 1990s.
In the US, transnational corporations who were most aligned with these newly emerging
production structures, lobbied the US state to change tax laws in ways that facilitated corporate
restructuring. This was also true in US foreign economic policy, where political organizations
led by the Business Roundtable became vehicles for promoting the liberalization of capital
markets, policies which benefitted globally competitive US-based financial interests as well as
non-financial corporations who sought to increase reliance on foreign markets for the production
of intermediate goods and component inputs that would be designed, branded and distributed by
the parent firm. The liberalization of foreign stock and bond markets helped to connect producers
of intermediate goods in the developing world to supply chains that extended back to the US and
other developed country markets. Transnational firms would link with foreign producers, either
in the form of joint ventures, subsidiaries or independent contractors, to produce products
incorporating the technological specifications and packaging required by the parent firm. Foreign
producers at the higher end of the production chain could raise money for their costs of doing
business by tapping newly emerging domestic stock markets, which could be financed in part by
global institutional investors as well as domestic financiers who wanted to realize profits from
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the newly emerging transnational production networks. Other foreign producers, at the lower end
of the production chain and not capital-intensive enough to enter domestic stock exchanges,
would produce component parts at cheap costs at the bottom of the supply chain, with an
overwhelming dependence on cheap labor to realize the slimmest of profit margins.
A political model of corporate influence in US foreign policy can be linked to the
position of corporations along the global supply chain. US-based transnational firms at the top of
the supply chain have the strongest representation within the Business Roundtable, arguably the
most influential corporate political organization in US foreign policymaking—especially US
foreign economic policy and trade policy. In the negotiations that provided the legal framework
for NAFTA, the membership of the Roundtable overlapped with the trade advisory committee
established by the US Special Trade Representative to negotiate the details of the agreement.
Corporate sectors that were disproportionately represented in the negotiation were those sectors
most involved in a global restructuring of production, including industrial and consumer
electronics, telecommunications, pharmaceuticals, computers, agribusiness, auto manufacturers,
and the most globally competitive textile and apparel manufacturers (Chase 2005). US retail
corporations and the leading commercial and investment banks also supported the agreement.
The opening of the Mexican financial markets allowed US-based institutional investors holding
mutual, pension and insurance funds to tap into the Mexican market as a condition for the
restructuring of Mexican debt. At the same time, the privatization of Mexican state-owned
industry provided opportunities for the expansion of supply networks linking US transnational
corporations to subcontractors in the Mexican market. This was especially true in auto parts and
electronics produced in the maquiladora sector. This sector has expanded rapidly after the
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passage of NAFTA, alongside other manufacturing sectors that are closely linked to intermediary
trade in US global value chains (Yang 1998).
The US state played a significant role in establishing the political conditions necessary
for a greater consolidation of supply networks in Mexico. A 1982 change in US banking
regulations, The Export Trading Company Act, allowed commercial banks to invest directly in
import-export firms as part of their foreign operations. In addition, there were further changes in
US banking regulations due to a relaxation of Federal Reserve requirements that allowed
commercial banks to gradually expand the percentage of their capital investments in stock and
bond markets (Bhargava, Fraser 1998) . Finally, the Brady Plan of 1989 allowed Mexico to
finance some of its debt by a “debt for equity” swap in which commercial banks could purchase
equity stakes in shares of Mexico’s newly privatized firms as a substitute for outright repayment
of debt obligations. The privatization of Mexican firms during the 1980s helped create a
transnational political coalition that linked US-based financial corporations—in commercial and
investment banking as well as institutional investors—to a newly emerging Mexican supply
network that was increasingly owned by a relatively small number of Mexico’s wealthiest
financial investors. Represented politically by the Mexican Businessman’s Council, the largest
37 Mexican firms dominated the privatization of state assets, accounting for 80 percent of the
value of all privatizations between 1982 and 1991 (Moody 1995: 101). The Business Roundtable
and the US Chambers of Commerce worked closely with Mexican investors to support
privatization initiatives during the 1980s that became institutionalized with the passage of
NAFTA.
In the case of Mexico, a transnational political coalition could emerge more easily than
was possible in other contexts due to the historical ties between US capital and Mexican capital,
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especially in the Maquiladora sector, which had been established as a legal arrangement in the
1960s, and in agribusiness, which large-scale Mexican firms and financial interests were already
deeply connected to US agribusiness firms in the purchase of machinery, fertilizer and trade
relationships. This process was connected to the ongoing transformation of global agriculture
toward more elaborate supply chains that linked to food processing, marketing and distribution
networks dominated by large-scale US agribusiness corporations, and structured in important
ways by the rising power of corporate supermarket retail chains (Spieldoch 2010).
The Centrality of Finance in Global Restructuring
The financial sector had seen the largest growth in profit margins since the shift toward a
“shareholder governance model” during the 1980s. Non-financial firms have become steadily
more dependent on investments in the financial sector, including stock buybacks and dividend
payments, which have displaced long-term capital investment in plants and equipment. This
process has created, at times, a surge of wealth from financial speculation, but at the expense of
long-term (and more stable) investments in capital equipment that can produce jobs. The shortterm imperatives of keeping institutional investors satisfied has meant a greater reliance on
financial investments that have high short-term rewards but greater long-term risks.
Furthermore, an emphasis on short-term growth has served to crowd out investment in real
capital, as a detailed econometric study of investment patterns by non-financial firms has
demonstrated (Yi 2003).
Non-financial corporations, driven by pressures from institutional investors for high stock
valuations, and having shed productive capital assets in favour of a greater reliance on branding,
marketing and distribution of a product at the top end of the value chain, have steadily expanded
their reliance on portfolio investments in global markets, a further indication of the
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financialization of production. This trend is indicated by statistics on foreign direct investment
from the late 1980s through the late 1990s, when the composition of foreign direct investment
shifted disproportionately to portfolio financing (Haley 2001: 18). In other words, transnational
corporations involved in global supply networks are increasingly relying on institutional
investors to finance those supply networks through portfolio funds and bond issues. Normally,
when foreign direct investment increases, as it has during the 1980s and 1990s, there is a
decrease in bond financing. This is because foreign direct investors have traditionally funded
large infrastructure projects as part of their foreign investment expenditures. Therefore, those
projects have typically been less reliant on financing through bond or portfolio markets.
However, the trends of the 1980s and 1990s defied this historical pattern: FDI financing has
depended much more on bond and portfolio financing than it has in the past. This has meant a
much more central role for institutional investors, whose financing of FDI has been important in
establishing the linkage between transnational corporations at the top of the global supply chain
and the supply networks based in emerging markets in the developing world (Haley 2001: 2443).
The increased importance of institutional investors as a nexus between transnational
corporations and global supply chains is a crucial component of the new financialization of
production. By the middle of the 1990s, there was good evidence that emerging market fund
managers controlled as much as 55 percent of portfolio flows to emerging markets in the
developing world (Haley, 2001: 33). This category of fund managers is dominated by
institutional investors that manage mutual funds, pension funds, investments of insurance
companies, banks, brokerage firms, and large multinational corporations. The Reuters database
that track these funds indicated “only 56 funds that fall into the category of emerging market
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funds in the US and Europe” (Haley, 2001: 34). Furthermore, “within this fund universe, five
institutional investors hold 72 percent of these assets” (Haley, 2001: 35). The concentration of
these funds among just five institutional investors provides a starting point for understanding the
political and economic power of institutional investors in the new global production system.
Institutional investors exist because of the increased importance of global portfolio
investments to the bottom line of financial and non-financial corporations alike. The increasingly
competitive world of global capitalism has led the most global and competitive transnational
corporations to restructure their operations around financial investment allocations that are tied
to assessments of foreign portfolio markets. Institutional investors that manage large-scale
financial assets are important political and market mediators for transnational corporations
looking to expand supply networks into emerging markets. The Clinton Administration tied
much of its foreign economic strategy during the 1990s to prying open portfolio markets to
access by US-based institutional investors. This has been elaborated most fully by the work of
Peter Gowan, who has noted the geopolitics associated with US efforts to offer both “carrots and
sticks” to developing countries in exchange for liberalization of capital markets, a process that
contributed to the Asian financial crisis of 1997.
The rush to liberalize capital markets as a US-IMF “solution” to economic crises in the
developing world is the essence of the turn to neoliberalism from the 1980s through the early
2000s. That political turn has been over-determined by a constellation of actors at the top of the
corporate pyramid whose profit margins have been much more firmly tied to an accumulation of
financial assets than was the case prior to the mid-1980s. This is true for non-financial firms
increasingly tied to investment strategies that are at least partly the product of an ascendancy of
institutional investors as powerful shareholders within the corporate boardroom. In addition,
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non-financial corporations at the top of increasingly elaborate global supply chains look to
institutional investors to manage the monetary investments of the firm, which are increasingly
diversified in an array of global portfolio products. Non-financial corporations use a variety of
mechanisms, including currency speculation and hedge funds, to help manage risks associated
with rising portfolio investors. And they also utilize external signals from a relatively small
number of top institutional investors to decide whether or not to invest in particular emerging
markets, or to pull out investments if political and market signals are problematic.
The ability of commercial and investment banks to merge operations and to engage in a
higher percentage of risky proprietary investments has been politically possible due to a steady
increase of political influence by the financial sector on US economic policy—both domestic and
foreign. The easing of restrictions placed on the ability of commercial banks to use depositors’
money to engage in stock and bond investments did not materialize with the elimination of the
Glass-Steagall Act in 1999. Instead, as early as the 1980s, changes in US trade law allowed US
commercial banks to invest in export-import companies in foreign markets, a policy that helped
contribute to the establishment of supply linkages between US parent corporations and their
emerging foreign subsidiaries and subcontractors. By the late 1980s, the US Federal Reserve
began a process of easing the regulations that limited commercial banks’ investment in capital
assets. The debt crisis faced by developing countries during the 1980s further embedded
financial institutions, including commercial banks, investment banks and institutional investors,
in the purchase of newly privatized assets in countries such as Mexico, where newly emerging
Mexican financial groups worked closely with US money managers to take advantage of the
profits of privatization.
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As a former member of the board of the directors of the IMF has recently commented, the
US political system, and much of its foreign policy apparatus, suffers from the same ailment that
the IMF has identified in developing countries: state capture by a financial oligarchy that has
such a hold on state policy that it most powerful members have been the recipients of the largest
financial bailout in US history—on terms highly favourable to the profit margins of the biggest
financial holding corporations left standing (Johnson 2009). The politics of these financial
relationships have been well-documented elsewhere. What is most striking is how deeply
embedded the rest of the US economy has become on the financialization of assets in lieu of
productive investments in capital necessary to create jobs for the US working class. In the midst
of this current capitalist crisis, the profit margins of non-financial and financial corporations have
risen over the past two years, in direct contrast with the wages of US workers—which have
fallen. These statistics are directly related to a playing field that has been politically stacked
against the working class for some time, both here and abroad. That there appears to be no
political appetite for redressing this balance is a testament to the enduring political strength of
the transnational corporate network in US and global politics, and the lack of an effective
counterweight to their agenda.
Transnational Interest Blocs and Business Conflict
The implications of this research for analysis of corporate interests and US foreign policy
is that a transnational interest bloc located at the top of global supply chains has established a
disproportionate influence over US foreign economic policy. Represented by business
associations led by the Business Roundtable, this transnational interest bloc is characterized by
its location at the top of the supply chain pyramid. High-tech firms are well-represented, with
“system integrator” firms having established overwhelming control of the high value added
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aspects of the global computer and software markets. After the previous two decades of mergers
and acquisitions, a handful of brand-name manufacturers have consolidated their positions at the
top of global supply chains across numerous sectors of the global economy. In addition, retail
firms occupy an important strategic space in this framework, with their ability to utilize just-intime delivery systems to force costs down the supply chain toward primary producers. And, as
noted in the previous section, institutional financial investors, with their capacity to move money
rapidly across an increasingly deregulated financial landscape, have emerged as central players
in the financing of global supply chain networks.
Together these entities constitute a “system integrator” transnational interest bloc which
has affected US foreign policy through lobbying networks that have shaped the content of
foreign trade and investment agreements. However, this bloc of interests, due to their diverse
positions within the global supply chains and their shifting linkages with other actors occupying
different positions within supply chain networks, cannot always achieve unity on policy
positions. For example, corporate sectors in the high-tech industry who now focus entirely on
activities at the top of the global supply chain, including patent ownership, research and
development, marketing and distribution, have typically pushed for the most aggressive
liberalization of foreign markets in order to facilitate unhindered access (at the lowest cost) to
potential supply networks. Manufacturing interests that still have a stake in ownership of
production activities often prefer quasi-protectionist clauses in regional trade agreements that
allow them time to adjust to the costs of integrating production within regional markets ahead of
potential competitors.
To summarize, what I term a transnational interest bloc has four fundamental features
that can be captured through a content analysis of trade and investment agreements negotiated by
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the US state in combination with sectors of transnational capital located within different
positions in global supply networks (Cox, 2008). First, this transnational interest bloc is led by
transnational firms based in the market economies of the US, the EU and Japan, and linked to
policymakers through business networks and associations that are uniquely privileged to
influence regional and global trade and investment agreements. In the US, these transnational
firms are represented most prominently by the Business Roundtable, the International Chambers
of Commerce, the Americas Business Council and numerous sectoral associations, and are linked
to the trade negotiation process through the Office of the US Trade Representative’s Trade
Advisory Committees.
Second, firms and sectors of transnational capital connected to policymakers in the US,
the EU and Japan, have both common and conflicting goals, depending on their position within
the world economy. In the cases of NAFTA and DR-CAFTA, some sectors linked to US
policymakers pushed for policies that discriminated against firms whose investments were based
outside of North America and CentralAmerica-DominicanRepublic. Other sectors supported a
wide liberalization of investment, trade, regulatory and property rights protections in NAFTA
and DR-CAFTA that provided equal market access to all foreign investors. Similarly,
transnational capital based in the EU and Japan have pursued alternative versions of a Singapore
agenda within the WTO that suggests goals that are partly complementary and partly distinct
from their US-based counterparts.
The third feature is the linkage between business associations, government bureaucracies
and ministries in the developing world and transnational firms based in the developed market
economies of the US, the EU and Japan. For example, the structural shifts in the process of
globalization during the 1980s provided the basis for greater political cooperation between US-
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based transnational capital and firms and government bureaucracies and ministries in Mexico
and the Caribbean Basin that were crucial in building support for NAFTA and DR-CAFTA.
These relationships have been important in negotiating the political frameworks for the
expansion of supply chains and investment networks that extend from the US to developing
countries.
Fourth, in the cases of NAFTA and DR-CAFTA, the power relationships and institutional
structures of each member state’s political system provide the context for understanding how and
to what extent a particular transnational interest bloc is able to advance their policy preferences.
In the cases of NAFTA and DR-CAFTA, the market size of the US allowed state negotiators and
US-based transnational capital significant advantages in crafting the final policy outlines of trade
and investment agreements signed with poorer countries. The ascendancy of neoliberal ideology
among state bureaucrats in Mexico, Central America and the Dominican Republic, reinforced by
growing ties between state actors and transnational capital, has also facilitated ratification of
these agreements. The role of the US state and US-based transnational business organizations in
promoting NAFTA and DR-CAFTA is part of a broader strategy of utilizing regional trade and
investment agreements to secure policies that go beyond what is currently allowed in multilateral
forums such as the WTO.
The ability of “system integrator” firms to capture the majority of profits and wealth
connected to global supply chains is contested by rival firms located at different positions along
the supply chain. At the same time, the contradictions of neoliberal trade and investment
agreements are being expressed politically with the growth of populist states in Latin America,
and the emergence of NGO movements with ties to labor and environmental groups that are
sometimes able to negotiate more favourable terms for the distribution of profits toward lower
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levels of the supply chain. As such, the political conflicts over the distribution of supply chain
benefits are likely be one of the key issues for students of world politics to address in the near
future. I hope this journal and the scholarly contributions presented here can make a significant
contribution to this effort.

Bibliography
Akard, P. (1992). “Corporate Mobilization and Political Power: The Transformation of US
Economic Policy in the 1970s,” American Sociological Review, Vol. 57 (5): 597-615.
Arrighi, G. (1994). The Long Twentieth Century, London, U.K.: Verso.
Bhargava, R. and Fraser D. (1998). “On the Wealth and Risks Effects of Commercial Bank
Expansion into Securities Underwriting: An Analysis of Section 20 Subsidiaries,” Journal of
Banking and Finance, Vol. 22: 447-465.
Blackburn, R. (2008). “The Subprime Crisis,” New Left Review, Vol. 50: 63-105.
Burris, (2008) “The Interlock Structure of the Policy-Planning Network and the Right Turn in
U.S. State Policy,” Research in Political Sociology, Vol. 17: 3-42.
Carroll, W. and Carson, C. (2003). “Forging a New Hegemony? The Role of Transnational
Policy Groups in the Network and Discourses of Global Corporate Governance,” Journal of
World Systems Research, Vol. 9 (1): 67-102.
Carroll, W. (2010). The Making of a Transnational Capitalist Class: Corporate Power in the 21st
Century. London: Zed Books.
Catteneo, O., Gerefi, G, and Staritz, C. (2010). Global Value Chains in a Post-Crisis World: A
Development Perspective, Washington, D.C.: International Bank for Reconstruction and
Development.
Chase, K. (2005) Trading Blocs: State, Firms and Regions in the World Economy, Ann Arbor,
MI.: University of Michigan.
Cox, R. (2008). “Transnational Capital, the U.S. State and Latin American Trade Agreements,”
Third World Quarterly, Vol. 29 (8): 1527-1544.
Cox, R. and Skidmore-Hess, D. (2008). U.S. Politics and the Global Economy: Corporate
Power, Conservative Shift, Boulder, CO.: Lynne Rienner.

26

Cox, R., ed. (2012). Corporate Power and Globalization in US Foreign Policy, London:
Routledge Press.
Cowling, K. and Tomlinson, P. (2005). “Globalization and Corporate Power,” Contributions to
Political Economy, Vol. 24 (1): 33-54.
Davis, G. and Greve, H. (1997). “Corporate Elite Networks and Governance Changes in the
1990s,” American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 103 (1): 1-37.
Dore, R. (2008). “Financialization of the Global Economy,” Industrial and Corporate Change,
Vol. 17 (6): 1097-1112.
Dreiling, M. (2000). “The Class Embeddedness of Corporate Political Action: Leadership in
Defense of the NAFTA,” Social Problems, Vol. 47 (1): 21-48.
Epstein, G. (2005). Financialization and the World Economy, Northhampton, MA.: Edward
Elger.
Ferguson, T. and Johnson, R. (2009) “Too Big to Bail: The Paulson ‘Put,’ Presidential Politics
and the Global Financial Meltdown, International Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 38 (1): 324.
Ferguson, T. and Rogers, J. (1984). Right Turn: The Decline of the Democrats and the Future of
American Politics. New York, N.Y.: Hill and Wang.
Fligstein, N. (2001). The Architecture of Markets: An Economic Sociology of Twenty-First
Century Capitalist Societies, Princeton, N.J.: PrincetonUniversity Press.
Gowan, P. (2009). “Crisis in the Heartland: Consequences of the New Wall Street System,” New
Left Review, Vol. 55, Jan.-Feb.: 5-29.
Haley, M. (2001). Freedom and Finance: Democratization and Institutional Investors in
Developing Countries, New York, N.Y.: Palgrave.
Jenkins, J. and Eckert, C. (2000). “The Right Turn in Economic Policy: Business Elites and the
New Conservative Economics,” Sociological Forum, Vol. 15 (2): 307-338.
Johnson, S. (2009). “The Quiet Coup,” The Atlantic. available online at:
http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/toc/2009/05/.
Krippner, G. (2005). “The Financialization of the American Economy,” Socioeconomic Review,
Vol. 3: 173-208.
Kuttner, R. (2007). The Squandering of America: How the Failure of Our Politics Undermines
Our Prosperity, New York, N.Y.: Knopf.

27

Milberg, W. and Winkler, D. (2010). “Financialization and the Dynamics of Offshoring in the
USA,” Cambridge Journal of Economics, Vol. 34: 275-293.
Milberg, W. (2010). “Shifting Sources and Uses of Profits: Sustaining US Financialization with
Global Value Chains,” Economy and Society, Vol. 37 (3): 420-451.
Moody, K. (1995). “NAFTA and the Corporate Redesign of North America,” Latin American
Perspectives, Vol. 22 (1): 95-116.
Nolan, P., Zhang, J. and Liu, C. (2007). The Global Business Revolution and the Cascade Effect,
New York, N.Y.: Palgrave MacMillan.
Orhangazi, O. (2008) “Financialization and Capital Accumulation in the Non-Financial
Corporate Sector: A Theoretical and Empirical Investigation on the US Economy,” Cambridge
Journal of Economics, Vol. 32: 863-886.
Phillips, K. (2008). Bad Money: Reckless Finance, Failed Politics and the Global Crisis of
American Capitalism. New York, N.Y.: Viking.
Prechel, H. (1997): “Corporate Transformation to the Multilayered Subsidiary Form: Changing
Economic Conditions and State Business Policy,” Sociological Forum, Vol. 12 (3): 405-439.
Robinson, W. (2004). A Theory of Global Capitalism: Production, Class and State in a
Transnational World, Baltimore, Maryland: Johns Hopkins.
Serfati, C. (2008). “Financial Dimensions of Transnational Corporations, Global Value Chain
and Technological Innovation,” Journal of Innovation Economics Vol. 2: 35-61.
Soederberg, S. (2010). Corporate Power and Ownership in Contemporary Capitalism: The
Politics of Resistance and Domination, London, U.K.: Routledge.
Speildoch, A. (2010). “NAFTA Fueling Market Concentration in Agriculture,” Minneapolis,
MN: Institute for Agriculture and Trade Policy.
Yang, Y. (1998). “Post-NAFTA Production and Sourcing Development in the Maquiladora
Program,” International Management and Data Systems, Vol. 98 (6): 269-368.
Yi, K. (2003). “Can Vertical Specialization Explain the Growth of World Trade?” Journal of
Political Economy, Vol. 111 (1): 52-102.
Zey, M. and Camp, B. (1996). “The Transformation from Multidivisional Form to Corporate
Groups of Subsidiaries in the 1980s: Capital Crisis Theory,” Sociological Quarterly, Vol. 37 (2):
327-351.

28

29

